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BRICS Power Play: China’s Bold US Dollar Move in Saudi Arabia

The global financial architecture is experiencing a seismic shift, and it’s happening in ways most analysts didn’t predict. While everyone’s been focused on de-dollarization rhetoric and potential BRICS currencies, China just executed a strategic maneuver that could fundamentally reshape dollar liquidity management worldwide.

China Issues $2 Billion in US Dollar Bonds—In Saudi Arabia

Here’s what makes this development so significant: China recently issued $2 billion in sovereign bonds denominated in US dollars, not yuan, directly in Saudi Arabia. The interest rates on these bonds are remarkably close to US Treasury rates—within just 0.1% to 0.3%, or one to three basis points.

What this means is staggering. China can now borrow in US dollars at virtually the same rate as the United States Treasury. Think about that for a moment. China is essentially positioning itself as an alternative manager of dollar liquidity, operating right at the heart of the petrodollar system.

The Strategic Brilliance Behind This Move

This isn’t about de-dollarization in the traditional sense. China isn’t abandoning the dollar—it’s co-opting it. With an expected trade surplus with the United States reaching $940 billion, China is awash in dollars. Rather than simply recycling them back into US Treasuries as has been the historical pattern, China is creating an alternative pathway.

The implications cascade in multiple directions. First, China is now competing directly with the US Treasury Department in global capital markets. For Saudi Arabia and other nations, instead of automatically recycling petrodollars into American debt instruments, they can now channel those same dollars into Chinese sovereign bonds at comparable rates.

The calculus for investors suddenly becomes far more interesting. From a stability standpoint, China offers something the United States increasingly doesn’t: predictability. The bureaucratic and economic stability in China’s operations presents a compelling alternative for institutional investors who’ve grown wary of American political volatility.

The Belt and Road Connection

Here’s where this strategy reveals its full dimension. China’s Belt and Road Initiative currently includes 152 countries, many of which carry substantial dollar-denominated debt. If China scales this Saudi Arabia experiment from $2 billion to $20 billion or beyond, it could use those accumulated dollars to help emerging nations pay down their US dollar obligations while simultaneously funding Belt and Road infrastructure projects.

This creates a triple advantage: China positions itself as a financial intermediary within the dollar system, helps nations escape debt dependency on the United States, and advances its own global infrastructure ambitions—all while maintaining the capital controls that prevent the yuan from becoming a reserve currency, which China has explicitly stated it doesn’t want.

Malaysia’s Strategic Retreat from Full BRICS Membership

Against this backdrop of financial maneuvering, Malaysia’s recent decision to halt its application for full BRICS membership becomes more comprehensible. During the latest ASEAN summit in Busan, South Korea, Malaysian officials announced they would remain a partner country rather than pursuing full membership, despite months of enthusiasm from both Russian and Chinese ministers who had promoted Malaysia as meeting all criteria for membership.

The timing of Malaysia’s reciprocal trade agreement with the United States reveals the underlying calculation. Malaysia exports over 10% of its total trade to America, with integrated circuits representing more than 20% of its global trade market share. These integrated circuits are vital components in semiconductor manufacturing—an industry where the United States is aggressively building supply chain independence from China.

Malaysia’s geographic position adds another layer of complexity. With ongoing civil conflict in Myanmar to the west, recent tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, and political protests in the Philippines, Malaysia faces regional instability on multiple fronts. Former President Trump’s threats of 100% tariffs on BRICS nations aren’t empty rhetoric—his administration has already demonstrated willingness to pressure India on agricultural exports, engage in tariff confrontations with Brazil, and maintain aggressive stances toward China and Russia.

Malaysia appears to be following Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” playbook—bending with the wind while maintaining relationships with both major powers. For smaller nations caught between the United States and China, choosing neither side completely has become the safest strategic position.

Egypt’s Precarious Gamble

While Asia navigates great power competition, Egypt faces a different crisis altogether—one that illuminates the devastating impact of International Monetary Fund debt structures.

Egypt owes $8.6 billion to the IMF, more than double the next most indebted African nation (Kenya) and comparable only to Argentina’s crushing IMF obligations. This debt comes with familiar strings: austerity measures, social service cuts, and currency devaluation. The Egyptian pound has plummeted nearly 90% against the US dollar over the past decade, driving inflation above 20% and devastating citizens’ purchasing power.

Against this economic backdrop, Egypt is constructing a new administrative capital at an estimated cost exceeding $58 billion. The project includes grandiose ambitions: the world’s tallest building (the Oblisco Capital Tower), a mosque accommodating 100,000 worshippers, the largest cathedral in the region, an 80,000-seat stadium, new military headquarters, and a sprawling medical city.

The contradiction is stark. Average Egyptian citizens, suffering from currency devaluation and austerity-driven service cuts, largely cannot afford cars—yet the new capital sits a 12-hour walk from Cairo with no public transportation infrastructure planned. The city is being built for an elite class while the population struggles with basic economics.

The funding sources reveal Egypt’s desperation. In 2017, Egypt legally ceded strategic territories including Sanafir and Tiran to Saudi Arabia in exchange for project funding. The UAE has committed $35 billion in investment, effectively purchasing influence through land deals that transfer sovereign territory for capital.

Egypt faces a refugee crisis on three borders: Libya’s ongoing civil war to the west, Sudan’s devastating conflict to the south (which has displaced hundreds of thousands), and Israel’s recent closure of the Gaza border crossing to the north. These simultaneous pressures occur while Egypt imports $4 billion in wheat annually—a dependency rendered unstable by the Russia-Ukraine conflict that disrupted traditional supply chains.

The pattern resembles an infinite loop: IMF debt requires austerity, austerity devastates the population and economy, economic weakness necessitates more foreign investment, and foreign investment requires territorial or strategic concessions. Egypt is selling its sovereignty in increments to fund a capital city its citizens cannot access, all while owing debt it cannot repay.

What the US Can—and Cannot—Do

Returning to China’s dollar bond issuance, the United States faces a strategic dilemma with no easy solutions. Imposing sanctions would validate every concern developing nations have about dollar system weaponization, accelerating the very de-dollarization Washington fears. The UN has already declared unilateral sanctions illegal under international law, and their primary effect has been pushing targeted nations toward alternative systems.

Raising Treasury interest rates to make US bonds more attractive would trigger immediate problems. With $38 trillion in national debt and massive deficits, higher rates would exponentially increase debt servicing costs, potentially forcing a recession. The Federal Reserve has limited room to maneuver when the cure might prove worse than the disease.

The most extreme option—restricting China’s ability to clear dollar transactions—would essentially detonate the global financial system. Such an action would instantly destroy the dollar’s reserve currency status, achieving China’s long-term objectives in a single catastrophic move.

China has effectively created a financial checkmate scenario. By operating within the dollar system rather than opposing it, they’ve positioned themselves beyond the reach of traditional countermeasures. The question isn’t whether the United States can respond effectively—it’s whether any response exists that doesn’t accelerate American financial decline.

The Emerging Multipolar Reality

These three situations—China’s bond strategy, Malaysia’s diplomatic balancing act, and Egypt’s debt trap—illustrate different facets of the same transformation. The unipolar moment is ending, not with dramatic confrontation but through gradual financial repositioning.

Smaller nations are learning they must navigate between great powers rather than choosing sides definitively. Middle powers are discovering that dollar dependency comes with costs that may outweigh benefits. And rising powers are finding ways to work within existing systems while simultaneously creating alternative pathways.

The next phase of this transition will test whether the United States can adapt its approach to a world where dollar dominance persists but is no longer absolute. China’s Saudi Arabia experiment represents just the opening move. If successful, expect similar arrangements across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia—each one incrementally shifting the balance of financial power.

For investors, policymakers, and citizens, the message is clear: the financial architecture that defined the post-World War II era is being rebuilt in real-time, and the final structure will look fundamentally different from what came before.

What to Watch Next

Several indicators will signal whether China’s strategy gains traction:

The transformation of global finance won’t happen overnight, but the direction of travel has become unmistakable. The question is no longer whether the system will change, but how quickly and what emerges in its place.

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